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CONSIDERING RECONSIDERING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

CHARLES GARDNER GEYH†
In Reconsidering Judicial Independence, Professor Stephen Burbank revisits
the nature of the relationship between judicial independence and judicial
accountability1—a relationship that he has elucidated over the course of an
illustrious career. As Burbank emphasizes, the continuing success of this
dichotomy depends on preserving a balance between its halves. But forces
generations in the making have led to a new assault on the independence of
the judiciary in the age of Trump, which has put the future of the
independence–accountability balance in doubt. The age-old rule-of-law
paradigm, which posits that independent judges put aside their personal
biases and follow the law, has been debunked by data showing that judges are
subject to ideological and other inﬂuences, undermining this traditional
justiﬁcation for judicial independence.2 To avert the erosion and collapse of
judicial independence, we must defend it with recourse to a diﬀerent
paradigm—a legal-culture paradigm. The legal-culture paradigm appreciates
that independent judges are acculturated to apply and uphold the law as best
they can, but also recognizes that judges have discretion that is subject to
extralegal inﬂuences—inﬂuences that better accountability can manage.
Reconsidering Judicial Independence is important for what Professor
Burbank has to say about judicial independence, and I will get to that; but the
piece is also a tour of “beautiful, downtown Burbank.”3 Like Burbank,
† John F. Kimberling Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Many thanks
to Dakota Coates for his research assistance.
1 Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty Years in the Trenches and in the
Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 18 (2019).
2 See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 54 (2016) (describing empirical studies).
3 HAL ERICKSON, “FROM BEAUTIFUL DOWNTOWN BURBANK”: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF
ROWAN AND MARTIN’S LAUGH-IN 1968–1973 (2000).
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California in the aging turn of phrase from Rowan and Martin’s Laugh-In, the
cityscape of Professor Burbank’s scholarship may not strike the untrained
observer as eye-catching. His work is not divertingly shrill—it avoids juicy
generalizations and overwrought conclusions and it includes no self-indulgent
manifestos—although it does feature a 182-page law review article on the
history of the Rules Enabling Act.4 Also like Burbank the town, which was
home to one of the most powerful television networks of its era, Burbank the
scholar’s body of work is home to one of the most important and inﬂuential
thinkers (and doers) in American law. And to no small extent, the less than
ostentatious proﬁle of his scholarship’s skyline is a key to its greatness: he is
more interested in getting it right than espousing splashy conclusions the data
cannot support, making friends in high places, or being lionized as the hero
of any particular cause. Burbank’s scholarship eschews self-indulgent ﬂash, in
favor of making an enduring contribution to the administration of justice.
My scholarship has touched on the subject of judicial independence more
than a few times as well. In the spirit of full disclosure, I am the Mini-Me to
Burbank’s Dr. Evil. When Burbank was working with the House Judiciary
Committee on matters related to judicial discipline, I was serving as counsel
to the Committee. As a ﬂedgling academic, I was a consultant to the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, on which Professor
Burbank served as member and scribe. I was the director of the American
Judicature Society’s (AJS) Center for Judicial Independence; Burbank was on
the AJS Executive Committee. I also edited WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH
IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE—to
which Professor Burbank contributed a chapter that he discusses in his
article.5 Suﬃce it to say that we have studied the same issues and analyzed
them in similar ways, which makes me a well-positioned reviewer of
Burbank’s judicial independence scholarship and service.

4 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). Despite
its girth, this is one hell of an article that is required reading for anyone who teaches or writes on
litigation procedure. Moreover, it deserves an honorable mention here because the Rules Enabling
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018)), did
more than authorize the federal courts to promulgate their own procedural rules. Taken together
with legislation of the same era that established both the Judicial Conference of the United States
(originally denominated the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges), Pub. L. No. 67-298, § 2, 42 Stat.
837, 838 (1922) (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2018)), and the Administrative Oﬃce of
U.S. Courts, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939) (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 601
(2018)), and transferred budgetary control of the courts from the executive to judicial branch, id.,
the Rules Enabling Act did much to assist in establishing a more independent judicial branch in the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.
5 Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility, in
WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT
STAKE 41 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
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I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
AS THE COIN OF THE REALM
Burbank was not the ﬁrst to recognize a relationship between judicial
independence and accountability. If one stands in the ﬁeld of judicial
independence scholarship and swings a salmon, one is likely to hit half a
dozen articles that dwell on this important relationship.6 Burbank’s article
underscores the essential starting point for any conversation about judicial
independence: the conception of independence and accountability as two
sides of the same coin. In a system of government where the judiciary is called
upon to uphold the rule of law on a case-by-case basis, independence and
accountability each legitimate the other. Without independence, a judge can
be driven by fear or favor to disregard the law and reach whichever conclusion
will mollify those upon whom the judge is dependent. Without
accountability, a judge can be liberated to disregard the law and reach
whichever conclusion suits her fancy. And by conceptualizing judicial
independence and accountability in terms of the consequences that ﬂow from
their absences, we can see both, as Burbank emphasizes, not as ends in
themselves, but as instrumental values that protect other objectives: the rule
of law, due process, and access to justice.7
Likening judicial independence and accountability to two sides of the
same coin also emphasizes that independence and accountability must be in
a state of relative equilibrium. If that equilibrium is corrupted and the coin is
weighted to skew the toss in favor of independence or accountability, the
virtues of both—which depend upon their balance—are lost. For an
interdisciplinary scholar like Professor Burbank who stands with one foot in
theory and the other in practice, this is where life gets tricky. Judges and the
lawyers who appear before them are often more protective of independence
as a means to curb intrusions upon their province, while legislators and the
general public that they represent tend to be more earnest about promoting
judicial accountability to the people judges serve.8 Many academic lawyers,
who have opted into a profession steeped in legal norms, ﬁnd judicial
6 See generally, e.g., Stephen Kelson, Judicial Independence and the Blame Game: The Earliest Target
is a Sitting One, 15 UTAH B.J., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 14; Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 2168 (2006); Ryan L. Souders, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elections in the
United States, 25 REV. LITIG. 529 (2006); Thomas Tinkham, Applying a Rational Approach to Judicial
Independence and Accountability on Contemporary Issues, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633 (2011); Edward
H. Trompke, A Natural Tension, 62 OR. ST. B. BULL., Feb./Mar. 2002, at 9; Frances Kahn Zemans, The
Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625 (1999).
7 Burbank, supra note 1, at 24; see Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial
Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 238-44 (2012) (noting that the “ermine myth”—that independent
judges are inﬂuenced by facts and laws alone—is antiquated, but that independence nonetheless
promotes the rule of law, due process, and justice).
8 See generally GEYH, supra note 2.
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independence easier to embrace than many political scientists, who, by virtue
of their training, are more likely to think of judges as politicians in robes for
whom independence is problematic.9
Against this backdrop, one cannot work and write in full-throated support
of both judicial independence and accountability without alienating some
people along the way or compromising one’s convictions. As implied by the
trail of nonplussed acquaintances described in his essay, Burbank has opted
in favor for his integrity and the courage of his convictions—a point he once
punctuated to me privately with a colorful observation: “You can’t make
chicken salad from chicken shit.” The extent to which Burbank has devoted
his professional life to preserving the balance between independence and
accountability is remarkable. While Burbank was the Chair of the AJS’s
Editorial Board, he decried attacks against the independence of judges,10
whom he criticized elsewhere for being insuﬃciently accountable to operative
law in his writings critical of Judge Weinstein11 and the Supreme Court.12 By
the same token, as an architect of disciplinary process reform, Burbank has
strived to assure the accountability of judges whose autonomy he has
defended in his scholarship on the architecture of judicial independence.
In discussing how the two-sided coin of judicial independence and
accountability is operationalized, Burbank references my work for the
proposition that informal institutional norms have evolved to preserve the
desired balance between judicial independence and accountability.13 Those
independence norms emerged to dissuade Congress from exploiting the full
panoply of its powers, which could all but obliterate the independent judiciary
that the Framers sought to establish in their Constitution, by means of
unrestrained impeachment, court-packing and unpacking, budget-slashing,
9 See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHO IS TO JUDGE? THE PERENNIAL DEBATE OVER
WHETHER TO ELECT OR APPOINT AMERICA’S JUDGES 117-19 (2019) (comparing the “legal and
political science communities” in their respective approaches to understanding and explaining “the
decisions and conduct of judges” in the context of judicial elections versus appointments); Eileen
Braman & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Path Dependence in Studies of Legal Decision-Making, in WHAT’S LAW
GOT TO DO WITH IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note
5, at 114, 114 (“[P]olitical scientists are creatures of their training and professional socialization.”).
10 Editorial, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, 85 JUDICATURE 260, 260 (2002) (“[J]udicial
independence is only a means to an end and . . . no society would want a judiciary that was
completely independent and hence completely unaccountable.”).
11 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the
Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1974, 1984 (1997) (arguing that while “[a]ll of us would
be better off if more federal judges emulated . . . Jack Weinstein[],” “certain aspects of [his] judicial work
. . . may cause concern from the perspective of judicial independence and accountability”).
12 See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT:
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017).
13 Burbank, supra note 1, at 24 n.26 (citing CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS &
CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006)).
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jurisdiction-stripping, defiance of court orders, and so on. I have characterized
the balance these norms strike—between courts and Congress, independence and
accountability—as a “dynamic equilibrium.”14 Episodic spikes of anticourt
sentiment elicit proposals for Congress to bring the courts to heel, which are
quieted with recourse to traditional independence norms that help to stay
Congress’s hand—until the next transition of political power brings a new spike.15
If this was where the story ended, it would be the Constitution’s corollary
to a Hallmark after-school special that closes with courts and Congress, cast as
toe-headed teens who have resolved their latest spat, walking down the bucolic
road of institutional norms, flipping their independence–accountability coin as
they bask in the sunshine of eternal equilibrium. But that is not where the story
ends—a point to which Burbank alludes and which I want to develop here.
II. OUT WITH THE OLD: THE ANTIQUATED
RULE-OF-LAW PARADIGM
To fully appreciate the precarious future that judicial independence faces,
it is important to introduce two additional dichotomies that Professor
Burbank discusses. The ﬁrst is between diﬀuse and speciﬁc support for the
courts. Diﬀuse support is systemic support, which respects the dynamic
equilibrium between independence and accountability, aided by the evolution
and entrenchment of norms, and enables judges to decide, as Burbank frames
it, “What does the law require?”16 Diﬀuse support manifests as public
conﬁdence in the legitimacy of the judiciary that remains stable despite
occasional decisions with which the public disagrees.17 Speciﬁc support, in
contrast, is contingent support, in which the judiciary’s legitimacy in the
public mind turns on “What have you done for me lately?”18 Speciﬁc support
is volatile by nature, and sublimates the rule of law to the rule of majoritarian
politics, by hinging public conﬁdence in the courts on whether the public
shares the policy outcomes of the courts’ decisions, rather than whether those
decisions uphold operative law.

GEYH, supra note 13, at 253-82.
Charles Gardner Geyh, The Choreography of Courts–Congress Conﬂicts, in THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19, 19-20 (Bruce Peabody ed.,
2011) (summarizing the “predictable pattern” of periods of anticourt sentiment in the federal courts:
“ﬁrst comes political realignment; then attacks against holdover judges; counter-attacks against court
critics; and, ﬁnally, normalization”).
16 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 27 (“[P]olitical scientists refer to . . . the public’s diﬀuse support
for the courts—support that persists even in the face of unpopular decisions, where so-called speciﬁc
support is lacking.” (footnote omitted)).
17 Id.
18 Id.
14
15
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The second dichotomy that Burbank discusses is between law and policy.
Like independence and accountability, Burbank notes that law and policy are
two sides of the same coin: law implements policy, while policy informs the
interpretation of law—they are inextricably intertwined.19 But here is where
the story darkens. Preserving the balance between law and policy depends on
preserving diffuse rather than specific support for the courts. If public support
for the courts depends on specific support derived from judges implementing
preferred policy outcomes, then the relevance of law is sublimated. And if law
is sublimated to policy, this corrupts the related balance between independence
and accountability: why afford judges independence from the control of the
electorate or their elected representatives if courts are simply comprised of
politicians in robes whose role is to implement the public’s policy preferences
and preserve specific support for the courts?
To recap, the American judiciary owes its long-term stability to an array
of moving parts that preserves constructive tensions between independence
and accountability, between courts and Congress, between law and policy, and
between diﬀuse and speciﬁc public support for the courts. I have argued
elsewhere that the balances struck across this array have been guided by a
rule-of-law paradigm that informed the framing of the U.S. Constitution and
that has structured our thinking about the judiciary in the generations since.20
That paradigm, in brief, posits that if judges are aﬀorded a measure of
independence from political and popular pressure, they will disregard
extralegal inﬂuences and impartially uphold the law on a case-by-case basis.21
It is a paradigm that favors 1) robust independence, oﬀset by just enough
accountability to correct mistakes and catch rogues; 2) a Congress that defers
to independence norms; and 3) courts that uphold the law without regard to
their personal policy preferences—promoting diﬀuse support.22
Judges repeat the rule-of-law paradigm like a mantra.23 But times are
changing. Burbank begins his essay by noting that, “[j]udicial independence
19 Id. at 25 (“Going down that path enables one quickly to grasp another essential proposition,
which is that judicial independence and judicial accountability are not discrete concepts at war with
each other. They are complements or, again, diﬀerent sides of the same coin.”).
20 GEYH, supra note 2, at 16-23.
21 Id. at 18-19.
22 Id. at 16-43.
23 Justice Alito discussed the paradigm at length in his opening statement for his Supreme
Court nomination, stating that

The role of a practicing attorney is to achieve a desirable result for the client in the particular
case at hand. But a judge can’t think that way. A judge can’t have any agenda . . . . [or] have any
preferred outcome in any particular case . . . . The judge’s only obligation—and it’s a solemn
obligation—is to the rule of law, and what that means is that in every single case, the judge has
to do what the law requires.
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is in the air—again.”24 True enough, but why? Is it because the latest round of
judicial-independence talk is like the spring, cyclical and inevitable as the
seasons? If so, we can proceed to the discussion secure in the knowledge that
spring showers will yield to summer sun. Or is judicial independence in the air
because the asteroid has landed and shot particulates skyward that presage the
possibility of an extinction event? From where I sit, the answer is a little from
column A and a little from column B. We are indeed entering the latest in a
centuries-long series of anticourt cycles following the transition of power to the
Trump Administration, but this latest cycle must be viewed against the backdrop
of more serious and sustained developments, generations in the making, that
have eroded the rule-of-law paradigm and threatened its longevity.
I have elaborated on the sustained developments that jeopardize the ruleof-law paradigm in prior work, and shorthand them here:
•

•

Beginning in the 1920s, American law schools spawned the legal
realism movement.25 Legal realists challenged the “Santa Clause story
of complete legal certainty.”26 They argued that when faced with legal
indeterminacy, judges struggle between competing claims to decide
what the law requires, and “since there is that struggle, how can they
do otherwise than select the one that seems to them to lead to a
desirable result”?27
As the legal realist movement in American law schools was winding
down, the frequency of dissenting and concurring opinions on the
U.S. Supreme Court increased measurably, beginning in 1941.28

Conﬁrmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2006)
(statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
Justice Roberts also sought to allay Congress’s fear by resorting to analogizing judges to
mere umpires calling balls and strikes, presumably constricted in judgment by the prescribed
edges of the strike-zone. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
In 2015, then-Judge Kavanaugh gave a speech at the Catholic University of America entitled
The Judge as Umpire, in which he reﬂected on the precise drafting of the National Football League’s
rulebook in deﬁning what is a “catch.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65
CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 690-91 (2016); see also Geyh, supra note 7, at 217-18 & n.142 (providing other
examples of judges who have stated the importance of having a judiciary that follows the rule of law
rather than its own partisan beliefs).
24 Burbank, supra note 1, at 18.
25 GEYH, supra note 2, at 46.
26 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 260 (Anchor Books ed. 1963).
27 Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 359 (1925).
28 Cass Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 C ORNELL L.
R EV . 769, 780-83 (2015).

42

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online
•

•

•

•

[Vol. 168: 35

Beginning in the 1940s, political scientists picked up the ﬂag of the
fallen realists, correlated majority and dissenting opinions to the
ideological orientations of the justices, and developed an attitudinal
model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which posited that judges
are inﬂuenced by their attitudes or ideologies.29
Beginning in earnest in the late nineteenth century, Supreme Court
confirmation proceedings became increasingly fixated on the nominee’s
political ideology and its impact on the nominee’s future rulings.30 That
fixation would devolve into an obsession beginning in the 1980s and spill
over into circuit and district court confirmations beginning in the 1990s.31
Beginning in the 1980s, state supreme court elections became “noisier,
nastier, and costlier,”32 culminating in well-funded, ideologically
driven battles to defeat incumbents because of their rulings on tort
liability, capital punishment, criminal sentencing, same-sex marriage,
water rights, and abortion.33
Beginning in earnest in the latter half of the twentieth century, state
legislatures sought to relieve their supreme courts’ docket congestion
by establishing intermediate courts of appeals,34 while Congress did
the same by eliminating mandatory appeals for the U.S. Supreme
Court.35 An unintended consequence was to limit high-court dockets
to fewer, more indeterminate and ideologically charged cases.36 This
change required the courts to focus more on making new law in
controversial cases and focus less on correcting trial court errors in

29 See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES 1937–1947 (1948) (using nonunaimous decisions to chart the political
alignments and blocs of the “Roosevelt Court” justices).
30 GEYH, supra note 13, at 214-15, 221.
31 Id.
32 David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1369, 1373 n.5 (2001) (quoting Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74).
33 GEYH, supra note 2, at 55-61. One recent example is the latest, hotly contested Wisconsin
Supreme Court race. See Laurel White, Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Too Close to Call, WIS. PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 3, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-supreme-court-race-too-close-call
[https://perma.cc/9U9W-2Y3A] (describing the “razor-thin margin” separating the candidates who
both “vowed to serve as impartial justices on the court while pointing ﬁngers at their opponent’s
partisan aﬃliations and potential biases”).
34 Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 966
(1978) (ﬁnding that a “crucial development[]” in state court structure was “the establishment of
intermediate appellate courts between the trial courts and supreme courts”). Congress had similarly
established federal intermediate appellate courts in the Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, 26
Stat. 82. See Geyh, supra note 15, at 20-21 (referring to the Judiciary Act of 1891 as an instance where
“Congress manipulated Court jurisdiction to limit the justices’ policy reach”).
35 Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codiﬁed at
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2018)).
36 GEYH, supra note 2, at 32.
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noncontroversial cases, to the end of repeatedly elevating the political
proﬁle of the courts involved.37
Media coverage of courts has also changed. Supreme Court decisions
are routinely explained with reference to the ideological alignment of
the majority and dissent.38 Cable news channels oﬀer infotainment
that features court coverage with a transparent ideological bias.39
Furthermore, the internet has created a forum for citizen journalists—
unencumbered by professional norms that constrain the traditional
media—who publish ideologically charged attacks on disfavored
judges and their rulings.40

This protracted series of developments has cut the rule-of-law paradigm
to the quick. It suggests that independent judges do not set extralegal
inﬂuences aside and nurtures the view that independence liberates judges to
ﬂout the law and indulge their ideological biases. The new skepticism
underlying these developments is manifested in survey data. Signiﬁcant
majorities of the general public think that 1) federal judges are inﬂuenced by
their ideological preferences;41 2) that state judges are inﬂuenced by the

Id.
Id. at 36. See generally MICHAEL F. SALAMONE, PERCEPTIONS OF A POLARIZED COURT:
HOW DIVISION AMONG JUSTICES SHAPES THE SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC IMAGE (2018)
(ﬁnding that Supreme Court decisions with more dissenting justices receive more media coverage
and are likelier to be framed in ideological terms).
39 See GEYH, supra note 2, at 35-37 (“Insofar as the news is communicated in short, image-oriented
segments, the public’s understanding of judges and the judiciary will, of necessity, be impressionistic.”); cf.
Tom Rosentiel, Partisanship and Cable News Audiences, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://www.pewresearch.org/2009/10/30/partisanship-and-cable-news-audiences/ [https://perma.cc/D3883A7P] (“[T]here are stark differences in the partisan composition of the Fox News Channel, CNN and
MSNBC audiences.”). Compare, e.g., Levin: Left’s Agenda is Incompatible with Constitutionalism (Fox News
television broadcast June 29, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/levin-lefts-agenda-is-incompatiblewith-constitutionalism [https://perma.cc/F748-KCPJ] (arguing that liberals have turned the Court into a
“politburo” and would oppose the confirmation of any conservative to replace Justice Kennedy),
with Panelist Grills Kavanaugh’s Past Opinions (CNN television broadcast July 10, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/07/10/brett-kavanaugh-presidents-shielded-from-litigationbts-cpt-vpx.cnn [https://perma.cc/4T8M-KAP8] (debating then-Judge Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence on
whether a sitting president should be shielded from litigation).
40 GEYH, supra note 2, at 36.
41 CAMPBELL PUB. AFFAIRS INST., MAXWELL POLL ON CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND
INEQUALITY: LAW AND COURTS QUESTIONS FROM 2005 POLL
(2005),
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/data_sources/Law%20and%20Courts%20Que
stions%20from%202005%20Poll.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QUT-B6ZY].
37
38
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campaign support they receive;42 and 3) that judges say that they are
following the law when in reality they are acting on their personal feelings.43
III. IN WITH THE NEW: TRANSITIONING TO A
LEGAL-CULTURE PARADIGM
The extinction event scenario, then, is this: the ailing rule-of-law paradigm will
eventually collapse. When it does, it will take with it the primary rationale for
judicial independence: if judges are dissembling or delusional when they say that
they follow the law and in reality abuse their independence by disregarding the law
and imposing their own policy preferences, then judicial independence serves no
useful purpose. The collapse of the rule-of-law paradigm will then create a power
vacuum for partisan opportunists to fill with unprecedented forms of court control
imposed for the putative purpose of promoting judicial accountability.
To avert the possibility of this scenario materializing, I have proposed
transitioning from the rule-of-law paradigm, which has served us long and well but
outlived its utility, to a legal-culture paradigm. The legal-culture paradigm proceeds
from the premise that beginning in law school, future judges are immersed in a
legal culture that takes law seriously. At the same time, beginning in law school,
future judges learn that in hard cases, the law is often indeterminate and that when
choosing between two comparably plausible constructions of applicable law, a
judge’s background, education, race, gender, ideology, and other extralegal factors
can inform which construction the judge deems best.44 Note that independently
upholding the operative law as impartially as possible remains as central to what
judges do in the legal-culture paradigm as in its rule-of-law predecessor. The legalculture paradigm simply accommodates the empirical realities that law and policy
are (with a nod to Burbank) two sides of the same coin and that in close cases, a
judge’s reading of what the law requires can be informed by a judge’s policy
perspectives.
42 See James L. Gibson, Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Eﬀects of Campaign Speech?, 42
L. & SOC’Y REV. 899, 920-21 (2008) (ﬁnding that policy pronouncements by state judicial
candidates do not negatively aﬀect public perceptions of this court but policy promises do); James
L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style”
Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV., Feb. 2008, at 59, 59, 72 (concluding that acceptance of
campaign contributions by state judicial candidates leads to a “diminution of legitimacy” for courts);
James L. Gibson, “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns and the Legitimacy of State High Courts, 71 J. POL.
1285, 1298-1300 (2009) (ﬁnding that acceptance of campaign contributions by state judicial
candidates—not policy talk or attack ads—detracts from the institutional legitimacy of state courts).
43 Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S LAW GOT
TO DO WITH IT: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note 5, at
306, 308-09 (“A majority of poll respondents agreed that even though judges always say that their
decisions ﬂow from the law and the Constitution, many judges are in fact basing their decisions on
their own personal beliefs.”).
44 Geyh, supra note 2, at 87-88.
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In a legal-culture paradigm that defaults to the presumption that judges
are acculturated to follow the law as best they can, independence serves three
important purposes: 1) it buﬀers judges from external pressure to disregard
the law in cases when the law is otherwise clear; 2) it promotes due process
by enabling judges to give litigants their day in court (as good judges are
acculturated to do) without external pressure to railroad litigants to achieve
foreordained outcomes; and 3) it promotes justice by enabling judges to oﬀer
their best assessment of what the applicable facts and law are—unencumbered
by external pressure to reach outcomes demanded by elected oﬃcials, interest
groups, or voters, who lack the judge’s familiarity and commitment to
upholding operative facts and law.45
By acknowledging the empirical reality that judges are subject to
extralegal inﬂuences, however, the legal-culture paradigm must also
acknowledge the possibility that independence can liberate judges to go
rogue, ignore the lessons of their legal culture, disregard the law, and impose
their own policy preferences. For that reason, the legal-culture paradigm
contemplates a more robust role for accountability, relative to the rule-of-law
paradigm, to guard against maverick judges leaving the range. Here, the
narrative returns to Burbank, who rightly debunks the notion that, except for
the little-used impeachment process, Article III judges are eﬀectively
unaccountable.46 To the contrary, federal judges are accountable in myriad
ways. They are accountable to higher courts, via appellate review.47 They are
accountable to Congress, which oversees court budgets, size, structure,
administration, practice, and procedure, and can pass legislation overriding
the courts’ statutory interpretations.48 They are accountable to constitutional
amendments that overturn court decisions.49 They are accountable to a
disciplinary process that remediates judicial misconduct and disability.50 They
are accountable to a code of conduct with which federal judges (below the
Supreme Court) are bound to comply.51 They are accountable to a
disqualiﬁcation process, when judges act in ways that call their impartiality
into question.52 They are accountable to each other and the mutual respect

Geyh, supra note 15, at 90-100.
Burbank, supra note 1, at 28-29.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1291 (2018).
See generally GEYH, supra note 13 (exploring the federal judiciary’s independence from and
accountability to Congress).
49 Id.
50 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2018).
51 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES
(2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_
march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6P6-KEHQ].
52 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2018).
45
46
47
48
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judges seek on collegial courts.53 And they are accountable to their oaths of
oﬃce, when they swear to act impartially and perform the duties that the U.S.
Constitution requires.54
Some of the foregoing mechanisms hold judges accountable for bad
decisions while others hold them accountable for biases, misconduct, and
mismanagement that contribute to bad decisions. Either way, they oﬀer a
menu of alternatives to reassure a skeptical public that there are means to
deter judicial independence gone rogue, which the judiciary should embrace
and celebrate as critical to its legitimacy and as the price it must pay for its
continuing independence. The balance that my legal-culture paradigm seeks
to strike is decidedly Burbankian, for it eﬀectively proposes to counter a
sustained threat to judicial independence with better accountability.
Ultimately, then, the task remains to peddle the legal-culture paradigm to
the bench, bar, political branches, policy wonks, social scientists, media pundits,
and public who must embrace it if it is to replace the ailing rule-of-law
paradigm and recalibrate the balance between independence and accountability.
That task is complicated, however, by the Trump Administration’s recent
barrage of attacks upon the integrity of the courts, which challenges the
proposed legal-culture paradigm by rejecting its premises.55
President Trump has attacked judges for invalidating executive orders
without reference to operative law, proceeding from the premise that good
judges do not operate independently of the president but work with him to
achieve his policy goals.56 He has taken issue with adverse judicial rulings,
not by disputing their merits but by challenging the legitimacy of the judges

53 See generally Harry T. Edwards, Collegial Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (N.Y. Univ.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Working Paper No. 17-47, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3071857 [https://perma.cc/XB7W-WC2S] (describing the importance of collegiality
in courts and noting procedures that courts use to encourage collegiality in decisionmaking).
54 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018).
55 See In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts
[https://perma.cc/UXM5-4Q88] (compiling President Trump’s tweets that criticize the courts).
56 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary
“Demoralizing”, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trumpimmigration-ban.html?ref=politics&module=inline
[https://perma.cc/242M-S5RJ]
(quoting
President Trump as saying, “If these judges wanted to, in my opinion, help the court in terms of
respect for the court, they’d do what they should be doing”).
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themselves with labels like “so-called,”57 “so political,”58 or “disgraceful.”59 To
the consternation of the Chief Justice,60 the President has eﬀectively
stereotyped judges with reference to the president who appointed them.61
The proposed legal-culture paradigm accepts empirical reality and legal
realism by acknowledging circumstances in which ideology matters. The data
shows that the public is at peace with judges who are subject to realist
inﬂuences,62 but draws the line at judges who are perceived as nakedly
partisan actors.63 There is an important diﬀerence between the judge who
reaches result X because she thinks that X is what the law requires—even if
her conservative or liberal ideology inﬂuenced her thinking—and the judge
who reaches result X because X is what the judge’s appointing president would
want. Describing judges categorically as “Obama judges” or “Trump

57 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/8A3V-AP5Z] (“The
opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is
ridiculous and will be overturned!”).
58 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:33 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871679061847879682 [https://perma.cc/KD8M-78VF]
(“In any event we are EXTREME VETTING [sic] people coming into the U.S. in order to help
keep our country safe. The courts are slow and political!”).
59 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2017, 8:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/830042498806460417 [https://perma.cc/BVS5-Y3BG]
(“LAWFARE: ‘Remarkably, in the entire opinion, the panel did not bother even to cite this (the)
statute.’ A disgraceful decision!”).
60 Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of “Obama Judge,” Chief Justice Roberts Defends
Judiciary as “Independent”, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/
2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html [https://perma.cc/4YSS-NFV2].
61 See Jessica Gresko, Judge Sides with Congress over Trump in Demands for Records, AP NEWS (May
20, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/49d1caabd0124ef1b874eec67302c55d [https://perma.cc/E7EHTREA] (“[W]e think it’s totally the wrong decision by, obviously, an Obama-appointed judge.” (quoting
Trump)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 3:51 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065346909362143232 [https://perma.cc/3YJH-MMFH]
(“Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much
different point of view than the people who are charged with the safety of our country. It would be great
if the 9th Circuit was indeed an ‘independent judiciary.’”).
62 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the
U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213 (2011) (“The American people know that the
justices of the Supreme Court exercise discretion in making their decisions . . . . [L]egitimacy seems
to ﬂow from the view that discretion is being exercised in a principled, rather than strategic, way.”).
63 JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 123
(2009) (ﬁnding through empirical research that, among other things, “[m]ost Americans recognize
that judges engage in policy making” and accept this notion “to the extent that the discretion is
exercised in a principled, non-self-interested fashion”).
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judges”—and doubling down when the Chief Justice of the United States calls
you out—crosses that line.64
The ultimate strategy I propose is to meet in the middle, between the
fading, fairytale world of the rule-of-law paradigm and the seventh circle of
hell conjured by a president who regards judges as unprincipled, partisan
agents for whomever appointed them. The legal-culture paradigm represents
that middle ground
***
In this piece, I have used Professor Burbank’s essay as a way to introduce
and integrate some of my own ideas. That is possible because Burbank’s work
on judicial independence is foundational. It creates a basic structure for
thinking about judicial independence and accountability that serves as the
starting point for future scholarship in the field. And that is one hell of a legacy.
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64 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 22, 2018, 7:21 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065581119242940416 [https://perma.cc/5WRB-CBVN]
(“Justice Roberts can say what he wants, but the 9th Circuit is a complete & total disaster. It is out of
control, has a horrible reputation, is overturned more than any Circuit in the Country, 79%, & is used
to get an almost guaranteed result. Judges must not Legislate Security . . .”).

